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SCHOOLING, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND THE ECONOMY
Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor*
Abstract—We investigate how the link between individual schooling and
political participation is affected by country characteristics. Using individ-
ual survey data, we find that political participation is more responsive to
schooling in land-abundant countries and less responsive in human capital–
abundant countries, even while controlling for country political institutions
and cultural attitudes. We find related evidence that political participation
is less responsive to schooling in countries with a higher skill premium, as
well as within countries for individuals in skilled occupations. The evidence
motivates a theoretical explanation in which patterns of political participa-
tion are influenced by the opportunity cost of engaging in political rather
than production activities.
I. Introduction
THE relationship between schooling and human capital,on the one hand, and political participation, on the other,
has been one of the most widely studied topics in political
science and political economy. Empirical work in this line of
inquiry has typically found that more educated citizens dis-
play a greater propensity to engage in virtually all forms of
political activity, including voting, attending political events,
staying informed about politics, working on campaigns, con-
tributing money, and signing petitions.1 As a result, education
has even been labeled “the best individual-level predictor of
political participation” (Putnam, 1995a, p. 68). A large body
of related evidence also suggests that this microlevel relation-
ship extends to the macrolevel, with education and democracy
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1 Contributions to this large literature include Verba and Nie (1987),
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Putnam (1995b), Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady (1995), Bénabou (2000), Schlozman (2002), Dee (2004), Freeman
(2004), Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004), Hillygus (2005), and
Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007). See also Chong and Gradstein
(2009), who find a link between education and pro-democracy views.
positively correlated at the cross-country level.2 Since polit-
ical participation can be viewed as a set of activities aimed
at influencing or imposing checks and balances on the gov-
ernment, this aggregate relationship would appear to be a
natural consequence of that which is so regularly observed at
the individual level.
There is nevertheless considerable variation across coun-
tries in this link between schooling and political participation
(Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1987). To give an often-used exam-
ple, there is a stark contrast in how politically active citizens
of Latin American and East Asian countries are perceived
to be. Latin America is often seen as “a region of unusual
political phenomena . . . with its military coups, riots, demon-
strations, and frequent unscheduled changes of governments”
(Wynia, 1978, p. 23), whereas East Asian societies have been
broadly characterized as ones where “harmony and coop-
eration were preferred over disagreement and competition”
and “the conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as
dangerous and illegitimate” (Huntington, 1991, p. 24).3 This
presents an obvious puzzle since it is the East Asian countries
that have generally achieved higher levels of human capital
accumulation over the past half-century.4 At first blush, this
appears at odds with the strong positive correlation between
individual schooling and political participation found within
countries.
This paper argues that understanding this cross-country
variation requires examining how several pertinent coun-
try characteristics affect the intensity of the link between
individual schooling and political participation. Much of
this discussion has to date centered on such country vari-
ables as political institutions and cultural mores to explain
2 The idea that education engenders democracy dates back at least to
Dewey (1916) and Lipset (1959). However, the issue of causality and the
mechanisms that generate this relationship continue to be actively debated;
see Glaeser et al. (2004, 2007), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Bobba and Coviello
(2007), and Castelló-Climent (2008).
3 While Verba et al.’s (1987) seven-nation comparison did not cover Latin
America, it is interesting that they found the link between socioeconomic
resources (such as education) and political participation to be weakest in
the one East Asian society (Japan) in their study.
4 The data support these broad perceptions: In the WVS, the mean score for
Latin American respondents was 0.62 on a scale of 0–2 when asked about
their propensity to participate in lawful demonstrations (question E027),
compared with a mean score of 0.51 in East Asian countries. On the other
hand, the average total years of schooling in the population aged 15 and
above in East Asia was 8.0 in the year 2000, exceeding the average of 6.7
in Latin America (Barro & Lee 2000; calculated for the set of countries in
the WVS).
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Figure 1.—Partial Scatter Plots of the Coefficient of Individual Education against Country Characteristics
A: Arable land per worker, Log (T/L)    
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See section IIIA for details of how these scatter plots were obtained.
cross-country differences in the extent of citizens’ political
participation. We nevertheless argue that this is not the full
picture. We start from the observation that even as human
capital promotes political participation, it also plays a more
basic economic role as a factor input in production activities.
Our understanding of how schooling affects political engage-
ment will thus be incomplete if we ignore the production role
of human capital.
With this motivation in mind, we focus on a set of eco-
nomic variables that naturally affects the productivity of
human capital in production activities: a country’s factor
endowment mix. Our goal is to uncover how these country
characteristics systematically influence the microlevel rela-
tionship between schooling and political participation. To this
end, we use detailed respondent data from the World Val-
ues Survey (WVS) and the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) on various forms of political participation,
such as discussing politics, attending lawful demonstrations,
and voting. We pursue an empirical strategy that regresses
these measures of participation against the interaction of indi-
vidual schooling and country variables, while controlling
for schooling and a comprehensive set of other individual
attributes, as well as country-survey-wave fixed effects.
The data reveal a robust empirical role for country factor
endowments. Our key findings are summarized in figure 1,
which contains partial scatter plots of a measure of the respon-
siveness of political participation to schooling estimated for
each WVS country-survey wave, illustrated with respect to
several country variables. (See section IIIA for details on how
these scatter plots were obtained.) Panel A reveals a statisti-
cally significant upward-sloping relationship, indicating that
individual political participation tends to be more responsive
to increases in schooling in countries with a greater per
worker arable land endowment. Panel C shows that a higher
initial skill endowment tends instead to dampen the link
between participation and schooling. (We find no significant
relationship with per worker physical capital in panel B.) Of
note, cultural attitudes appear to play a complementary role:
countries that bear more favorable attitudes toward obedi-
ence exhibit a weaker link between individual schooling and
political involvement (panel D). Separately, we also find that
these effects are considerably weaker when we instead use
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a measure of voting from the CSES as our dependent vari-
able (see section IIIC), a result we discuss in more detail
below.
Motivated by this evidence, we propose an interpreta-
tion that is based on the interplay between the production
and political roles of human capital. A key premise here is
that political participation requires the use of human capi-
tal. For individual citizens, it has indeed been argued that
“political activities have considerable costs [and] require
the commitment of time and energy, often in considerable
amount” (Verba & Nie, 1987, p. 34), whether for attend-
ing political events or simply gathering news on political
developments. Importantly, for the economy as a whole,
large amounts of human capital are clearly devoted to
political activities in the work of politicians, lobbyists, and
volunteers.5
We adopt the view that human capital expands an individ-
ual’s capacity to process information and execute tasks, so
that educated individuals are on average more productive in
both the production and political spheres. In response to an
increase in human capital, a rational citizen will thus choose
to expand both production and political effort to make use of
this increased capacity. The key question is then how much
this person will raise production effort relative to political
participation. On the margin, this entails trading off the ben-
efit of increased political participation, which is needed to
contest the power of the government to tax or expropriate,
against the opportunity cost of additional production income
forgone.
In this setting, any socioeconomic or institutional force
that makes the use of human capital in production less entic-
ing will tend to raise the effort channeled toward political
participation relatively more than that toward production. In
particular, a greater abundance of the specific factor used in
the least skill-intensive sector (such as a larger endowment of
arable land for the agricultural sector) will raise the respon-
siveness of each citizen’s level of political participation to an
increase in schooling, and a greater abundance of the factor
used in the most skill-intensive sector will have the opposite
effect. This logic can be readily formalized by developing
and solving a model of an individual’s human capital alloca-
tion decision, as we show in the theory appendix (available
online).
We present several supplementary pieces of evidence that
provide further support for this underlying intuition. First,
to the extent that the skill premium proxies for the income
forgone from applying human capital to political rather than
production activities, we should expect participation to be
less responsive to increases in schooling in countries that
feature a high skill premium. Consistent with that, we find
evidence that a higher country skill premium is associated
5 In Brady et al.’s (1995) terminology, political activity takes up three types
of resources: time, civic skills, and money. The first two are directly related
to human capital, and money is often used to buy the use of other people’s
human capital.
with a weaker link between schooling and political partici-
pation and that the effect of factor endowments appears to
operate through its effect on the skill premium (see section
IVA). Second, we obtain similar results with an alternative
measure of the resource intensity of the economy based on
export data (see section IVB). Specifically, countries with a
higher share of food and agricultural raw materials exports
exhibit a stronger link between schooling and political par-
ticipation. Finally, applying the same logic within countries,
we would expect that individuals employed in skilled occu-
pations would display a dampened link between political
participation and schooling, and a converse relationship for
workers in unskilled occupations, because of the different
opportunity costs they face. This is exactly what we see when
we focus on variation within a single country, the United
States (see section IVC).
Our proposed explanation also suggests how the link
between political participation and schooling might vary
across different forms of political activity. Intuitively, this
relationship will be weaker for forms of participation that are
less taxing in their human capital requirements. For instance,
voting has been described as “the only political act requir-
ing relatively little initiative” (Verba & Nie, 1987, p. 77), as
well as being the least demanding form of political activity,
requiring the least in terms of civic skills (Brady, Verba, &
Schlozman, 1995). This is consistent with the weaker results
that we obtain with the voting data from the CSES.6 In this,
our explanation is also consistent with, and provides a pos-
sible rationalization for, the findings in several empirical
papers that have uncovered settings where the relationship
between education and voting was statistically insignificant
(Tenn 2007; Kam & Palmer, 2008; Berinsky & Lenz, 2008).7
Interestingly, our framework can be extended to shed light
on the question of why some governing regimes have invested
so heavily on education, as highlighted in our motivating
example of East Asia versus Latin America.8 We argue that
countries that feature a greater endowment of the factor used
specifically in the least skill-intensive sector witness, ceteris
paribus, more political participation. In such countries, this
will lead a self-interested ruler to invest less in human cap-
ital in order to soften the checks and constraints she might
6 The weaker results with voting could also be due to a number of other
factors. It may be that voting data based on respondent recall could be noisier
than data on other forms of political participation that are not as associated
with socially approved behavior; it is, for instance, well established that
voting is overreported in surveys (Bernstein, Chadha, & Montjoy, 2001). In
that same vein, the principal components methodology we use to construct
the WVS measure could help to filter out noise that is idiosyncratic to each
single participation variable. Finally, the country coverage of the CSES is
smaller, which yields lower precision.
7 Kam and Palmer (2008) consider a composite index that is a simple aver-
age of a number of different (self-reported) forms of participation, voting
included. This is quite possibly a noisier index of participation than our
measure based on a principal components methodology. They also limit
their attention to the effects of higher education.
8 For example, see Lee and Kim (1997) on South Korea; Birdsall, Bruns,
and Sabot (1996); and Brown (2002) on Brazil; and Ratliff (2003) for a
more general comparison.
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otherwise face from the citizenry.9 We find some suggestive
cross-country evidence that corroborates this intuition: coun-
tries with higher initial per worker arable land endowments
indeed witnessed smaller subsequent increases in average
years of schooling between 1975 and 2000. This effect was
strongest in countries that were not fully democratic, where
our political economy explanation is likely more applica-
ble. This argument is, moreover, prima facie consistent with
observed initial endowment conditions. In relatively land-
scarce East Asia, with its comparative advantage in labor- and
skill-intensive production, individuals are less inclined to
channel their energies toward political activities, in contrast to
more resource- and land-abundant Latin America. East Asian
governments thus rationally chose to raise the provision of
education to achieve output growth, as the underlying endow-
ment mix meant that the accompanying increase in political
activism would be modest. This framework thus offers a joint
explanation for patterns of political participation at the indi-
vidual level and differences in public investment in education
at the country level.
Our paper falls within the literature on the determinants
of political participation and its links to schooling. An addi-
tional contribution in this line is Charles and Stephens (2009),
who show that positive labor market shocks to earnings and
employment tend to lower turnout in gubernatorial and sena-
torial elections within U.S. counties, a result that is consistent
with our opportunity cost logic. Our paper also relates to a
growing literature on how initial conditions have influenced
long-run country development. This work has identified
how preexisting land and resource abundance (Engerman
& Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robertson, 2002;
Naritomi, Soares, & Assunção, 2007) and the disease envi-
ronment (Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2009) help to explain the
variance in institutional structures observed today across and
within countries.10 Our argument also contributes to a body of
work on the political economy of education provision by rul-
ing elites, including Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), Galor
and Moav (2006), De la Croix and Doepke (2009), Galiani
et al. (2008), Galor, Moav, & Vollrath (2009), and Zhang
(2008). On a broader note, it echoes calls for research in
the economics of education to recognize that governments
view human capital as more than just an input to production
and are indeed sensitive to the sociopolitical implications of
expanding education (Pritchett, 2003).
In what follows, we describe our empirical strategy in
section II. Section III presents our central empirical results
based on the WVS and CSES data. Section IV lays out our
9 This offers a potential explanation for the turnout puzzle of why voter
turnout has decreased historically in the United States and other democra-
cies, even as education levels were increasing (Brody, 1978)—what Aldrich
(1993) called “the most important substantive problem in the turnout
literature.” One possible reason could be the onset of skill-biased tech-
nological change, which has made human capital relatively more valuable
in production activities.
10 Similarly, Leamer et al. (1999) argue that initial factor endowments
were a root cause of the high income inequality observed in Latin America
today.
proposed explanation and provides several further pieces of
evidence in support of it. Section V extends the framework to
consider the issue of state provision of schooling and presents
some suggestive evidence consistent with our predictions
here. Section VI concludes. The theory appendix presents a
model that rationalizes the opportunity cost intuition behind
our proposed explanation of the empirical findings. (Note
that all the appendix material for this paper is available in an
online appendix.)
II. The Role of Country Characteristics: Empirical
Strategy
A. Empirical Model of Individual Political Participation
We seek to understand how key country variables might
influence the well-known relationship between an individ-
ual’s level of schooling and propensity to engage in political
activities. The natural starting point for this inquiry is the
extensive literature on the relationship between schooling and
political participation. Prior empirical studies in this litera-
ture have typically used microlevel survey data for a given
country and run regression specifications of the form
PolParti = β1Vi + β2Educi + εi, (1)
where i indexes individuals. PolParti is a measure of political
participation, and this is regressed against the respondents’
education level (Educi) and a vector of other individual con-
trols (Vi), such as age and gender; εi is a noise term. The
common finding here has been a positive and highly sig-
nificant β2 coefficient for a diverse range of participation
measures. (However, see Tenn, 2007; Kam and Palmer, 2008;
and Berinsky and Lenz, 2008, for some key exceptions.)
To uncover the role of country characteristics, we bring
together microlevel data on individual political participation
and macrolevel data on country attributes. We ultimately want
to check whether there are interaction effects of individual
education with country characteristics on measures of polit-
ical participation, using pooled data sets of country surveys.
We thus work with specifications of the form
PolPartict = β1Vi + β2Educi + β3Educi × Wct + Dct
+ ηc + εict , (2)
where c denotes country and t denotes time. In addition to
the individual attributes (Vi and Educi), equation (2) includes
interaction terms between individual education and a vec-
tor of country characteristics of interest (Educi × Wct) as
explanatory variables for participation (PolPartict). The key
parameter of interest here is the coefficient vector, β3, since
this captures how country attributes (Wct) systematically alter
the responsiveness of political participation to education at
the individual level. We affix a time index on the country
variables, since the data we use feature multiple surveys for
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the same country conducted in different years.11 The full
set of country-survey-wave fixed effects (Dct) controls for
all country- and time-specific variables that might affect the
average level of participation within each country and sur-
vey wave. We also cluster our standard errors by country to
accommodate correlated but unobservable shocks to politi-
cal behavior within countries that are relatively stable across
time. This is reflected in the ηc error term in equation (2); the
εict’s are standard i.i.d. noise.12
One clear advantage of this empirical strategy is that it
maximizes the use of the available data—all the individual
observations across countries and survey waves in the WVS
and CSES—as detailed below. It is nevertheless important
to bear in mind that the estimation of β3, which captures
how the coefficient of education differs across countries,
ultimately relies on the cross-country variation in the coun-
try characteristics (Wct) that are interacted with individual
education.
B. Data
Our primary source of individual data on political partic-
ipation is the World Values Survey (WVS), a rich study of
sociocultural attitudes around the world. Four waves of the
WVS are available (conducted in 1981–1984, 1989–1993,
1994–1999, and 1999–2004), but our regression analysis
draws on only waves 2 to 4 because the set of variables
is considerably more limited in wave 1. Although the sur-
vey waves do not constitute a balanced panel of countries,
the pooled data still give us a large number of observations
from 47 countries, with representation from all major conti-
nents. (Appendix table 1 describes the country coverage in
our eventual regression sample.)
Given the multifaceted nature of political participation, we
consider a range of measures for our dependent variable,
PolPartict . We base these measures on the following cate-
gorical response questions asked in the WVS (responses are
recoded so that higher values reflect more active participa-
tion):
1. Interest in politics (question E023): “How interested
would you say you are in politics?” 0 = Not at all inter-
ested, 1 = Not very interested, 2 = Somewhat interested,
3 = Very interested.
2. Importance of politics (question A004): “For each of
the following aspects, indicate how important it is in
your life. Politics.” 0 = Not at all important, 1 = Not very
important, 2 = Rather important, 3 = Very important.
11 We do not index the individual attributes, Vi and Educi, by time, since
the surveys are not a longitudinal panel, and we do not observe the same
individual more than once in the pooled data.
12 This empirical strategy is similar to Solt (2008), who interacts measures
of individual income against country inequality in order to examine whether
country inequality has a differential impact on the political engagement
of individuals in different income brackets. However, Solt (2008) uses a
country random effects rather than a fixed effects specification.
3. Discuss politics (question A062): “When you get
together with your friends, would you say you discuss
political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?”
0 = Never, 1 = Occasionally, 2 = Frequently.
4. Petition (question E025): “Now I’d like you to look at
this card. I’m going to read out some different forms
of political action that people can take, and I’d like
you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually
done any of these things, whether you might do it or
would never, under any circumstances, do it. Signing a
petition.” 0 = Would never do, 1 = Might do, 2 = Have
done.
5. Demonstrate (question E027): Same question as for
Petition, now referring to “Attending lawful demon-
strations.” 0 = Would never do, 1 = Might do, 2 = Have
done.
The first two measures can be viewed as soft measures
of participation, which relate more to interest in and atti-
tudes toward politics. These stand in contrast to the fourth
and fifth measures (Demonstrate and Petition), which are
hard measures of political action. While the soft measures
reflect activities that are not as publicly visible, we never-
theless view them as informative of the time and effort that
individuals routinely put in to stay informed of political devel-
opments and government policies. We view the third measure
(Discuss politics) as standing somewhere between the two
poles; it captures a form of tangible political action that is
less widely visible. Overall, this spectrum of variables pro-
vides a more comprehensive body of evidence than if we had
focused exclusively on any single measure of participation.13
Some readers might be missing a discussion of voting,
a measure of participation that has traditionally been used
in this line of research. Our second source of survey data,
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), sup-
plements the empirical analysis with information on voting,
since the WVS does not ask a direct question on respondents’
voting history.14 The CSES is a collaborative cross-country
project that undertakes surveys in the aftermath of national
elections, typically within one year. As with the WVS, local
researchers take the lead in conducting the survey, employ-
ing sampling methods to ensure a respondent pool that is
representative of the electorate. Two modules of data are
13 The WVS contains questions on participation in boycotts (question
E026), unofficial strikes (E028), and occupation of buildings or factories
(E029). When these variables were included, the results with the first prin-
cipal component are similar to what we see in table 1. However, used
individually as dependent variables, the results work less well. This is likely
because these latter three measures are more extreme forms of political par-
ticipation that elicit more “no participation” responses, hence resulting in
less observed variance. Moreover, these arguably speak less directly to polit-
ical action; for example, the question on strikes and occupying buildings
could relate more to labor relations.
14 The WVS does include a question asking respondents which party they
would vote for if an election were held tomorrow, to which one of the
response options is, “I would not vote.” This is, however, an indirect question
on voting intentions and is likely too noisy a measure of whether respondents
would actually translate their intentions into action.
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available (module 1 for elections from 1996–2002, module
2 for 2001–2006). Pooling the two modules gives us data
from 42 legislative or presidential elections in 25 countries.
Our variable of interest is a binary variable for whether the
respondent voted in the election, and we use this as another
PolPartict measure in logit regressions based on the speci-
fication in equation (2). It should be noted that the country
coverage here is more limited, given the shorter history of the
CSES project: the sample consists mostly of European and
North American countries; no African countries are included
yet.
Turning to the explanatory variables, we use each respon-
dent’s self-reported highest education level attained as a
measure of Educi. This is coded in the WVS on a cate-
gorical scale that ranges from a low of 1 (“inadequately
completed elementary education”) to a high of 8 (“univer-
sity with degree/higher education–upper-level tertiary cer-
tificate”). The WVS also contains a rich set of respondent
characteristics, including age, gender, marital status, number
of children, and income decile, which we use in our vector of
controls, Vi, in the regressions. The CSES includes respon-
dent education, reported on a similar 1–8 categorical scale,
as well as a set of other individual controls that is comparable
to the WVS.15
This WVS and CSES survey data are then merged with
several country-level variables (Wct). As discussed in section
I, we are particularly interested in the role of country factor
endowments, namely, the per worker arable land, physical
capital, and human capital stocks (T/L, K/L, and H/L,
respectively). We also use several other country variables as
auxiliary controls, including real GDP per capita, population,
Gini coefficient, and democracy. These variables are all from
standard data sources, the details of which are documented in
the data appendix (available online). In the results we report,
we use five-year lagged averages for all country variables for
each survey wave or module; the results are similar if contem-
poraneous values are used (available on request). (Appendix
tables 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for the WVS and
CSES country samples, respectively.)
One final country variable of interest that warrants further
discussion is related to the “values” or “culture” hypothesis,
which has often been advanced as an alternative explanation
for cross-country differences in political activism. This view,
popularly termed the “Confucian” or “Asian values” debate,
suggests that the unique cultural heritage of East Asia places
an emphasis on education, as well as on values such as
“placing order and harmony over personal freedom, [and]
respecting political leadership” (Milner 2000, p. 57). To try
to account for these differences, we focus on the role of
attitudes toward obedience. We base our measure of such
attitudes on the following WVS question (responses recoded
to be increasing in obedience):
15 The CSES income variable is reported in quintiles rather than deciles,
but its behavior is qualitatively similar in the regressions.
• Obedience in the workplace (question C061): “Peo-
ple have different ideas about following instructions at
work. Some say that one should follow one’s superior’s
instructions even when one does not fully agree with
them. Others say that one should follow one’s superior’s
instructions only when one is convinced that they are
right. With which of these two opinions do you agree?”
0 = Must be convinced first, 1 = Depends, 2 = Follow
instructions.
We take the mean response by country-survey wave to this
question as an indicator of how willing citizens are to accept
and defer to external sources of authority, and hence as a
proxy for the cultural preferences of citizens for political
consensus rather than open disagreement.
III. Schooling, Political Participation, and Country
Characteristics: What the Data Say
We now present our empirical findings on the determinants
of individual political participation and the role of country
characteristics. We start by employing a principal compo-
nents analysis to summarize the information contained in the
five WVS measures of participation. This allows us in prin-
ciple to extract the common component that reflects overall
political participation, while discarding the noise that might
be inherent in any single measure. Table 1 reports the results
from OLS regressions for the WVS data set, using the first
principal component of the five participation measures as the
dependent variable, PolPartict . Table 2 will report results for
each of the separate measures.
Column 1 presents a baseline regression, which includes
only individual-level variables and country-survey wave fixed
effects; this is equivalent to equation (2) with Wct as a null
vector. The results corroborate the common finding that polit-
ical participation is indeed increasing in individual schooling
for our pooled country sample. Of note, this effect is sig-
nificant despite our controlling for the income decile of the
respondent, so education does have explanatory power for
political involvement that is independent of the positive effect
of income status. The effects of the other individual controls
are relatively unsurprising: Older citizens are more politi-
cally active, but this tapers off after a certain age. Women are
less politically active. There is no significant effect of mar-
ital status, but participation decreases for respondents with
more children. Students are more politically active, as are
employed workers. These patterns remain very stable across
all specifications, even as we subsequently introduce country
variables into the regressions.
A. Country Factor Endowments
Following the empirical strategy outlined in section IIA,
we introduce the three country factor endowment measures in
column 2 by interacting them with individual education. (The
level effects of these country variables are absorbed by the
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Table 1.—Education, Factor Endowments, and Political Participation: WVS
First Principal Component
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.166∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.226 0.403∗ 0.306 0.352∗ 0.324∗
[0.008] [0.035] [0.036] [0.215] [0.199] [0.192] [0.185] [0.184]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗
[0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.038 0.005 −0.003 0.018 0.014
[0.012] [0.012] [0.039] [0.033] [0.035] [0.036] [0.034]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.167∗∗ −0.163∗∗ −0.165∗∗ −0.148∗∗ −0.099 −0.129∗ −0.128∗
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.060] [0.073] [0.069] [0.067]
Education × Log GDPpc 0.005 0.019 0.025 0.011 0.012
[0.030] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028]
Education × Log Pop −0.003 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Education × Gini −0.002 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Education × ELF Ethnic −0.013 0.016 0.013 0.012
[0.038] [0.039] [0.036] [0.036]
Education × Democracy 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Education × Socialist 0.013 0.034 0.029 0.024
[0.040] [0.037] [0.039] [0.037]
Education × Obedience −0.123∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.110∗∗
[0.045] [0.038] [0.046] [0.046]
Age 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Age2 −0.00035∗∗∗ −0.00031∗∗∗ −0.00033∗∗∗ −0.00033∗∗∗ −0.00039∗∗∗ −0.00037∗∗∗ −0.00038∗∗∗ −0.00038∗∗∗
[0.00004] [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005] [0.00005]
Female? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) −0.450∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗ −0.415∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.381∗∗∗ −0.394∗∗∗
[0.029] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028]
Married? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.017 −0.008 −0.007 −0.007 −0.000 −0.000 −0.005 −0.002
[0.017] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.018] [0.017]
Number of children −0.025∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Student? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.246∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
[0.056] [0.084] [0.085] [0.086] [0.050] [0.049] [0.043] [0.047]
Employed? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.019
[0.016] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.023] [0.025] [0.021] [0.026]
Income decile 0.037∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.039∗∗
[0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.019] [0.020] [0.019]
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding outlier countries? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income × Country Wave? No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Imputed individual controls? No No No No No No Yes Yes
Occupation dummies? No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 114,192 74,822 72,996 72,996 53,763 53,763 64,583 64,583
R2 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Number of countries 72 47 45 45 36 36 36 36
Number of surveys 105 66 64 64 49 49 49 49
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All columns include country-survey wave fixed effects. Columns 3–8 exclude outliers
with factor endowment ratios that differ from the sample mean by more than three standard deviations; this drops SGP (with a low T/L) and UGA (with a low K/L). Columns 6–8 control for income decile interacted
with country-wave dummies. Columns 7–8 apply the imputation procedure for missing individual-level controls. Column 8 adds occupation dummies, including a category for unreported occupation.
country-wave fixed effects, Dct .) We find evidence in favor
of a positive and significant effect on the interaction term
with log(T/L), as well as a negative effect on the interac-
tion with log(H/L). In other words, political participation is
more responsive to increases in individual schooling in coun-
tries with a higher per worker land endowment, and it is less
responsive to schooling in countries with a higher average
human capital endowment. While we also obtain a positive
effect on the interaction term with log(K/L) here, this will
turn out not to be robust in other specifications.
These patterns are validated when we subject the data to
more checks in the rest of table 1. In column 3, we exclude
potential outliers by removing countries that are more than
three standard deviations away from the sample mean for
any one of the three factor endowment variables. This drops
Singapore (with a very low log(T/L)) and Uganda (with a
very low log(K/L)), but the results are largely unaffected.
Column 4 adds two new interaction terms: education with
country real GDP per capita and country working-age pop-
ulation. These give strong confirmation that the arable land
and human capital interactions are not just picking up coun-
try wealth or size effects. On the other hand, the positive
Educi × log(K/L) coefficient from columns 2 and 3 loses
statistical significance when these controls are implemented.
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Table 2.—Education, Factor Endowments, and Various WVS Measures of Political Participation
Interest in Politics Politics Important Discuss Politics Demonstrate Petition
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A. OLS
Education 0.100∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.106 0.041∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.023
[0.015] [0.079] [0.014] [0.097] [0.015] [0.072] [0.018] [0.066] [0.019] [0.085]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.006∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.007 0.005
[0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.006 0.021∗∗∗ 0.024 0.008 0.002 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.009 −0.015
[0.006] [0.021] [0.005] [0.021] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005] [0.012] [0.008] [0.017]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.086∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.032 −0.032 −0.064∗∗ −0.025 −0.03 −0.019
[0.033] [0.041] [0.029] [0.032] [0.028] [0.025] [0.028] [0.022] [0.038] [0.032]
Education × Obedience −0.056∗∗ −0.033 −0.027 −0.033∗∗ −0.044∗∗
[0.025] [0.021] [0.017] [0.013] [0.017]
R2 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.30 0.32
B. Ordered logit
Education 0.218∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.293 0.151∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.241
[0.033] [0.174] [0.029] [0.195] [0.050] [0.226] [0.054] [0.192] [0.041] [0.208]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.027
[0.004] [0.010] [0.005] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.015] [0.012] [0.018]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.020 0.041∗∗∗ 0.046 0.025 −0.003 0.062∗∗∗ 0.051 0.029 −0.012
[0.012] [0.046] [0.011] [0.046] [0.017] [0.043] [0.014] [0.040] [0.020] [0.038]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.193∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.117 −0.124 −0.202∗∗ −0.033 0.002 0.095
[0.074] [0.081] [0.060] [0.068] [0.092] [0.084] [0.084] [0.072] [0.090] [0.070]
Education × Obedience −0.113∗∗ −0.064 −0.089 −0.094∗ −0.119∗∗∗
[0.053] [0.046] [0.058] [0.048] [0.043]
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.18
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding outlier countries? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Income × Country-Wave? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Imputed individual controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 86,829 71,897 92,856 77,122 94,045 77,518 83,263 72,071 84,085 72,540
Number of countries 50 37 52 38 52 38 49 37 49 37
Number of surveys 69 50 75 54 76 54 70 52 71 52
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All columns include individual-level controls for age, age squared, a gender dummy, a
married dummy, number of children, a student dummy, an employment status dummy, and income decile; and country-survey wave fixed effects. The odd-numbered columns report a lean specification containing the
interaction terms between individual education and country factor endowments, following table 1, column 2. The even-numbered columns report a full specification, following table 1, column 7; this includes further
interaction terms between individual education and country characteristics (Log GDPpc, Log Pop, Gini, ELF Ethnic, Democracy, Socialist, and Obedience); excludes country outliers (SGP, UGA); includes the income
by country-wave dummy controls; and applies the imputation procedure for missing individual controls.
Column 5 adds interaction terms involving several more
country attributes that a priori might matter for explain-
ing patterns of political participation. These include income
inequality (Gini coefficient), ethnic fractionalization (ELF), a
democracy index, and a socialist dummy (for communist and
former communist countries). The first two of these variables
speak to the issue of potential cleavages within the polity,
which could affect the degree of activism among citizens.
The democracy variable allows us to control for citizens’
formal access to political voice. The socialist dummy is a
means (albeit a fairly crude one) to try to capture the extent
to which the institutions of schooling were used by the state
for the purposes of indoctrination. Reassuringly, this does not
change our results for the education interactions with country
land and human capital endowments, with most of these aux-
iliary interactions exhibiting insignificant coefficients. (We
also include an interaction with the measure of cultural atti-
tudes on obedience, but defer a discussion of this to section
IIIB.) Column 6 includes a full set of interactions between
respondent income decile and the country-wave fixed effects
(Incomei × Dct), to check that the Educi × Wct terms are
indeed picking up the effects of education rather than that of
income (which tends to be highly correlated with education).
The findings for the Educi × log(T/L) interaction are indeed
robust in spite of this extensive set of controls. The signifi-
cance of the Educi × log(H/L) coefficient falls, although the
point estimate remains negative.
In column 7, we apply an imputation procedure for unre-
ported individual variables, to address the concern that
such missing observations in the WVS may not be ran-
dom omissions. Following Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shapiro
(2005), we assign the mean value observed within each WVS
country-survey wave to the corresponding missing obser-
vations, while also introducing a set of dummy variables
to indicate whether the value of the individual variable in
question was imputed. We find this leaves our main con-
clusions intact, with the Educi × log(H/L) coefficient now
negative and significant again at the 10% level. Also, the
overall effect of education on political participation does
remain positive when all the country variables in the inter-
action terms are evaluated at their sample median values
(a formal F-test yields a p-value < 0.001). Finally, col-
umn 8 controls for respondent occupation by including
dummy variables based on broad self-reported occupational
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categories.16 We do not use occupation in our baseline
individual-level controls because this would decrease our
sample size by up to 10%. We accommodate this in col-
umn 8 by including a category for missing occupation;
as it turns out, this category yields a negative and sig-
nificant coefficient (not shown), implying that individuals
who do not report an occupation have a lower propensity
toward participation. The results here are extremely similar
to that in column 7, confirming that the effects of educa-
tion that we have found also hold within broad occupational
groups.
Our central findings are best summarized in figure 1. To
obtain these partial scatter plots, we first ran the regression
specification in equation (1) separately for each WVS country
wave, with the full list of respondent traits from column 1 in
our control vector, Vi. Theβ2 coefficients estimated in this way
capture the responsiveness of political participation to school-
ing in each country wave. For each panel in the figure, we then
regressed these β2’s against the set of country variables, Wct ,
used in the column 5 specification (per worker factor endow-
ments and all the auxiliary country controls), excluding the
country variable of interest in the specific panel; the regres-
sion residuals are then plotted against the country variable of
interest. As anticipated by the table 1 results, the responsive-
ness of political participation to schooling clearly rises with
the per worker arable land endowment (panel A), but this link
appears to weaken in more skill-abundant countries (panel C).
Reassuringly, there are no obvious outliers in the figures that
might be unduly driving these observed patterns.
It is useful to provide a sense of how much country factor
endowments affect the responsiveness of political partici-
pation to the accumulation of one more discrete unit of
education (one step up the 1–8 scale). When we focus as
an example on the column 7 estimates, an increase in the
land endowment, log(T/L), from the 25th (Germany) to the
75th percentile (Finland) would raise this marginal response
to education by an amount equal to 0.06 standard devia-
tions of the cross-country distribution of average participation
scores. Repeating this calculation for log(H/L), a similar
interquartile increase in the human capital endowment (from
Spain to Germany) would decrease the marginal response
to education by about 0.07 standard deviations. These are
fairly moderate figures. Nevertheless, our sample does con-
sist heavily of European countries with similar endowment
ratios that tend to cluster around the sample median, so a
larger increase would arguably better reflect the range of
endowment ratios witnessed in practice around the world.
The marginal response to education roughly doubles to +0.12
standard deviations if we consider an increase in log(T/L)
from its 10th (Switzerland) to the 90th (United States) per-
centile; the corresponding figure is −0.12 standard deviations
16 The occupation dummies used here are based on the first digit of the
occupation code reported in the WVS: 1 for employer/manager, 2 for pro-
fessional or nonmanual worker, 3 for manual worker, 4 for agricultural
worker, 5 for military, 6 for never employed, and 8 for other. A separate
category is included for unreported occupation.
from increasing the human capital endowment from Indone-
sian to Norwegian levels. Alternatively, one can also gauge
these quantitative effects by asking how much the responsive-
ness of participation to schooling would change as a result of
these factor endowment shifts when evaluating all other coun-
try variables at their sample median. In the case of the 25th
to 75th percentile increase in log(T/L), this would raise the
overall coefficient of education from an initial value of 0.162
to 0.194, a more appreciable 19% increase. For log(H/L), a
similar increase in country human capital endowments would
lower the responsiveness to education by about 18%.
These conclusions based on the first principal compo-
nent carry over in large measure when we examine each of
the WVS participation variables separately in table 2. The
upper panel of table 2 reports the results from OLS. Since
the dependent variables are categorical in nature, the lower
panel performs the estimation using ordered logit regres-
sions instead. For brevity, we report only two regressions
for each measure of political participation: (a) a lean specifi-
cation containing the interactions with only the three factor
endowment variables, following column 2 in Table 1, and
(2) a full specification including all auxiliary country inter-
actions, following column 7 in table 1. (The results are
similar to other specifications and are available on request.)
Regardless of the estimation procedure, the findings rein-
force the main message of a positive cross-derivative between
education and country land endowment and a negative cross-
derivative between education and country human capital,
with the results especially strong for the land endowment
interaction. The point estimates are always of the same sign,
with the single exception of the ordered logit regressions
using Petition, where the Educi × log(H/L) coefficient is
positive but not significant.
We have thus far pooled together all available WVS waves
to maximize the size of our main sample. Table 3 confirms
that the findings are nevertheless qualitatively similar when
we examine each wave separately. Columns 1 and 2 restrict
the sample to wave 3 (1994–1999), while columns 3 and 4
focus on wave 4 (1999–2004). (The wave 2 sample is much
more limited, with only five countries, so we do not show
those results.) For each subsample, we present two regres-
sions, following the lean and full specifications from table 2.
The point estimates continue to reveal a positive interaction
effect for the country land endowment, as well as a negative
interaction effect with country human capital. While we do
lose some statistical significance, this is not surprising given
that the reduced sample entails a loss of efficiency. Overall,
our central results do not appear to be driven by any single
time period. (We return to the rest of the columns when we
discuss the evidence from the CSES below.)
B. Cultural Attitudes
To address the “culture” hypothesis, we explore whether
attitudes toward obedience systematically affect the inten-
sity of the relationship between schooling and political
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Table 3.—Education, Factor Endowments, and Political Participation: Different SurveyWaves
WVS Wave 3 WVS Wave 4 CSES Module 1 CSES Module 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Survey OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit
Education 0.204∗∗∗ 0.308 0.133∗∗ 0.441 −0.253 0.885 0.021 −0.754∗∗∗
[0.035] [0.378] [0.054] [0.261] [0.204] [0.814] [0.121] [0.179]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.011 0.016 0.022∗∗∗ 0.031 0.015 −0.066 0.049∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗
[0.008] [0.015] [0.007] [0.020] [0.029] [0.100] [0.018] [0.027]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.049∗∗ 0.035 0.039∗∗ 0.055 −0.052 0.829 0.062∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
[0.021] [0.102] [0.014] [0.046] [0.055] [0.627] [0.026] [0.045]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.215∗∗ −0.134 −0.074 −0.140 0.696∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ −0.024 0.627∗∗∗
[0.089] [0.099] [0.098] [0.116] [0.295] [0.090] [0.066] [0.080]
Education × Obedience −0.058 −0.134 1.088∗∗ 0.093∗
[0.078] [0.080] [0.430] [0.053]
Education × Compulsory Vote 0.070 0.717∗∗∗ −0.053 0.453∗∗∗
[0.052] [0.135] [0.051] [0.092]
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding outlier countries? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Income × Country Wave? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Imputed individual controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 28,874 24,290 40,822 37,674 27,094 22,693 29,884 26,533
R2 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.12
Number of countries 26 20 35 27 18 11 24 16
Number of surveys 26 20 35 27 18 11 24 16
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Columns 1–4 are estimated by OLS for WVS waves 3 and 4. Columns 5–8 are
estimated by logit regressions for CSES modules 1 and 2. All columns include individual-level controls for age, age squared, a gender dummy, a married dummy, number of children, a student dummy, an employment
status dummy, and income decile/quintile; and country-wave/module fixed effects. The odd-numbered columns report a lean specification containing the interaction terms between individual education and country
factor endowments, following table 1, column 2. The even-numbered columns report a full specification, following table 1, column 7. This includes further interaction terms between individual education and country
characteristics (Log GDPpc, Log Pop, Gini, ELF Ethnic, Democracy, Socialist, and Obedience); excludes country outliers (SGP, UGA); includes the income by country-wave/module dummy controls; and applies the
imputation procedure for missing individual controls.
participation. To this end, we include the measure of atti-
tudes toward obedience as an additional country character-
istic interacted with individual schooling, starting with the
column 5 specification in table 1.
We indeed find a negative and significant interaction
effect between education and obedience. This implies that in
countries inclined toward such attitudes and behavior, polit-
ical participation tends to be less responsive to increases
in individual schooling. This is also illustrated by the
clear downward-sloping relationship in panel D of figure 1.
Throughout columns 5 to 8, this interaction coefficient is
very stable in terms of size and significance, while its quan-
titative implications are similar to those for country factor
endowments. For example, the column 7 estimates imply that
moving from the 25th (Turkey) to the 75th (New Zealand)
percentile country would decrease the marginal effect of
individual schooling on political participation by about 0.06
standard deviations. These results are corroborated in table 2.
We consistently obtain a negative coefficient on the obe-
dience interaction for each separate participation measure
(even-numbered columns), although the results are slightly
weaker for Importance of Politics and Discuss Politics. We
also obtain negative point estimates, though not statistically
significant, in both the wave 3 and 4 subsamples (see table 3).
In sum, the evidence indicates that cultural attitudes play
an important role in explaining the cross-country variation in
the link between schooling and political participation. That
said, this is clearly complementary to, rather than in direct
conflict with, that of country factor endowments, as our prior
empirical results on the effects of factor endowments are not
displaced by the inclusion of the obedience interaction.
C. Voting
No assessment of political participation would be complete
without a discussion of voting, so we turn our attention next
to the CSES. This is particularly interesting because political
scientists have viewed voting as a distinct form of political
activity that is generally less demanding in terms of its human
capital requirements (Verba & Nie, 1987; Brady et al., 1995).
It has also been described by political sociologists as a passive
activity in contrast to the more active forms of participation
aimed at influencing the political system (Milbrath & Goel,
1977). The question then is whether voting displays the same
patterns as the more active and effort-intensive forms of par-
ticipation we have previously considered with regard to the
effects of country characteristics.
Given the binary nature of the voting variable, we esti-
mate equation (2) using a logit regression, with the findings
reported in table 4. Column 1 confirms the basic positive cor-
relation between education and the propensity to vote in the
pooled CSES data. Introducing the three-factor endowment
interactions with education in column 2, however, yields a
set of statistically insignificant results; in particular, the coef-
ficient on Educi × log(H/L) is now positive. That said, as
a form of political participation, voting is subject to institu-
tional idiosyncrasies that hardly affect other activities. For
instance, countries often have compulsory voting laws that
make voting a de jure mandatory duty of citizens. While
the extent to which such laws are enforced clearly varies,
it would a priori be important to control for them in the vec-
tor Wct of country variables, since they do influence citizens’
propensity to vote and could thus affect the link between
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Table 4.—Education, Factor Endowments, and Voting: CSES
Vote? (1 = Yes; 0 = No; Logit Regressions)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.186∗∗∗ −0.093 −0.144 0.256 −0.799∗ −0.753∗ −0.583 −0.532
[0.023] [0.130] [0.166] [0.430] [0.469] [0.433] [0.428] [0.413]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.038 0.041∗ 0.039∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.021] [0.023] [0.024] [0.022] [0.023] [0.022]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.036 0.041 0.303∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
[0.036] [0.036] [0.077] [0.121] [0.121] [0.095] [0.097]
Education × Log(H/L) 0.200 0.226 0.235 0.271 0.235 0.319∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
[0.143] [0.169] [0.147] [0.170] [0.145] [0.124] [0.124]
Education × Log GDPpc −0.191∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.070] [0.071] [0.057] [0.059]
Education × Log Pop 0.019 0.055∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
[0.015] [0.023] [0.020] [0.018] [0.017]
Education × Gini 0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Education × ELF Ethnic −0.526∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗∗ −0.452∗∗∗ −0.448∗∗∗
[0.189] [0.161] [0.136] [0.131]
Education × Democracy 0.056∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012]
Education × Socialist 0.037 0.006 0.017 −0.001
[0.080] [0.065] [0.068] [0.066]
Education × Obedience 0.262 0.244 0.203 0.203
[0.210] [0.202] [0.197] [0.197]
Education × Compulsory Vote 0.039 0.074∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗
[0.046] [0.034] [0.086] [0.073] [0.069] [0.069]
Age 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.010]
Age2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Female? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) −0.040 −0.060 −0.058 −0.054 −0.026 −0.024 −0.029 −0.060
[0.041] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.044] [0.044]
Married? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.321∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
[0.047] [0.051] [0.051] [0.052] [0.068] [0.069] [0.065] [0.065]
Number of children −0.004 −0.010 −0.009 −0.010 −0.013 −0.014 −0.015 −0.014
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
Student? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.549∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
[0.107] [0.128] [0.128] [0.127] [0.137] [0.137] [0.123] [0.123]
Employed? (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.122∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.116∗
[0.037] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.047] [0.047] [0.055] [0.060]
Income quintile 0.090∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
[0.016] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.041] [0.037] [0.021]
Country module fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income × Country-Module? No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Imputed individual controls? No No No No No No Yes Yes
Occupation dummies? No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 76,461 56,978 56,978 56,978 38,064 38,064 49,226 49,226
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
Number of countries 36 25 25 25 20 20 20 20
Number of surveys 59 42 42 42 27 27 27 27
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include country-module fixed effects. Columns 6–8 control for
income quintile interacted with country-module dummies. Columns 7–8 apply the imputation procedure for missing individual-level controls. Column 8 adds occupation dummies, including a category for unreported
occupation. There were no country outliers with factor endowment ratios differing from the sample mean by more than three standard deviations.
voting and education as well.17 We do this in column 3 by
including the interaction between individual education and
a compulsory voting dummy variable (from the CSES). The
results are fairly undistinguished, although the coefficient for
the Educi×log(T/L) term is now significant at the 10% level.
17 Verba et al. (1987) cite a study by Galen Irwin, who compared two elec-
tions in The Netherlands. In a 1970 election in which voting was optional,
the education-turnout relationship was “moderately strong,” whereas for a
1967 election conducted under compulsory voting, the turnout was “almost
equal across educational levels” (p. 8).
We obtain slightly stronger results in column 4, where
we also interact education with country real GDP per capita
and with population size, as well as in column 5, where we
introduce the full set of auxiliary interactions with coun-
try variables that we considered in table 1.18 In these two
columns, we also find a positive and significant effect of coun-
try physical capital on the relationship between voting and
18 There are no country outliers in terms of factor endowments along the
lines of the criterion used in table 1, column 3, given the smaller sample in
the CSES.
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education. The results are similar when we include the inter-
actions between individual income and country-module fixed
effects (column 6), impute values for the missing individ-
ual variables (column 7), or control for occupation dummies
(column 8).19 Although the point estimate on Educi is nega-
tive, the overall effect of individual schooling is still positive
and significant when all country variables are evaluated at
their sample median values (p-value from F-test < 0.001).
There are, however, other persistent indications that voting
is qualitatively different from the other measures of political
participation: we never find a negative cross-derivative effect
between schooling and country human capital or a significant
effect of the interaction term with obedience. It is interesting
that the point estimate of this latter coefficient is positive,
especially since voting can be construed as a form of partici-
pation that is often seen as a duty of citizens. We find also that
democracy tends to reinforce the positive education-voting
correlation while greater ethnic fractionalization dampens
this relationship. Looking back at table 3, the patterns in
the pooled sample are most similar to that when restricting
attention to module 2 (columns 7–8); there appear to be some
slight differences when running the regression on module 1
(columns 5–6), but there are only eleven distinct countries
represented in that module.
In sum, while the role of factor endowments is present, par-
ticularly that of the land endowment, this is considerably less
prominent than for the other more active forms of political
participation surveyed in the WVS. It is, moreover, impor-
tant to control for institutional features such as compulsory
voting laws in order to get a more comprehensive picture of
voting patterns. These weaker results are certainly consistent
with the idea that voting is inherently a very different form of
political participation. Having said that, other features may
contribute to this relative weakness. First, it has often been
argued that voting data are fairly noisy, given their reliance on
respondent honesty. Along these lines, the principal compo-
nents methodology applied on the WVS measures may have
helped to filter out noise in each separate variable more effec-
tively in order to focus on information that reflects common
participation trends. Finally, the more limited country cover-
age in the CSES may also have hindered our ability to obtain
more robust results.
IV. A Proposed Explanation
Our key empirical findings can be summarized:
1. The link between individual schooling and political
participation is stronger in countries that have a higher
arable land endowment per worker.
19 The occupation dummies are based on the first digit of the occupa-
tion code: 0 for military, 1 for senior official/manager, 2 for professional,
3 for associate professional, 4 for clerk, 5 for sales and service staff, 6 for
agricultural worker, 7 for craft and trade worker, 8 for plant and machine
operator, and 9 for elementary occupations. A separate category is included
for unreported occupation; responses coded in module 2 as “Refused,”
“Don’t Know,” or “Missing” are treated as unreported.
2. The link between individual schooling and political
participation is weaker in countries that have a higher
level of human capital per worker.
3. The link between individual schooling and political
participation is weaker in countries where cultural
attitudes are more inclined toward obedience.
4. These effects are weaker for voting than for more
human capital–intensive and active forms of partici-
pation.
What forces lie behind these facts, particularly facts 1 and
2? We hypothesize that the role of factor endowments is asso-
ciated with the way the production structure of the economy
conditions the choice of how much effort individuals would
rationally devote to political participation. We start from the
position that human capital expands an individual’s capacity
to process information and undertake tasks in both produc-
tion and political activities. In response to an increase in
education, an individual would rationally choose to increase
both production effort and political participation, with the
salient decision being how much to increase one relative to
the other. Intuitively, the opportunity cost of the production
income forgone from devoting more effort to political par-
ticipation is lower in countries where human capital is less
valuable in production activities. This would be the case, for
instance, when the country is land abundant, thus leading to
a production structure skewed toward more land- rather than
skill-intensive sectors. By the same token, the opportunity
cost of production income forgone is higher in skill-intensive
economies, thus dampening the responsiveness of an individ-
ual’s political participation to increases in schooling in such
countries.
We formalize these ideas in the context of a simple model,
which we develop in detail in the theory appendix. In this
model, individuals can choose to allocate their human capi-
tal among three different production activities that generate
direct output: agriculture, manufacturing, or services. Alter-
natively, they can choose to apply some of their human capital
toward political activities, which do not yield output directly
but rather help to protect their production output from expro-
priation due to bad governance or rent dissipation. We show
that there will be a positive correlation between human cap-
ital and political participation at the individual level, since
the higher opportunity cost of political participation for more
educated individuals is counterbalanced by an increase in the
benefit that can be obtained in the form of greater political
checks. However, we also show that the strength of this cor-
relation will depend on country characteristics, such as factor
endowments, that affect the relative productivity of one’s
human capital across these different activities, and hence the
opportunity cost of applying a marginal unit of human capital
toward the political rather than the production sector.
This interpretation is, moreover, consistent with fact 4: that
the effects of factor endowments are weaker for voting than
for the more active forms of participation. Given that voting
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has been characterized as requiring relatively little time or
effort, and hence bearing a relatively low opportunity cost in
terms of production income forgone, one would expect that
the intuition highlighted above would apply with less force to
voting patterns.20 That said, one might still expect to observe
some muted effects insofar as voting is positively correlated
with other forms of political participation at the individual
level.
In what follows, we turn to a series of additional empirical
exercises that provide further support for our interpretation
and explanation.
A. Skill Premium
While we have so far focused on the role of factor endow-
ments, a quick generalization of our basic intuition implies
that any country trait that raises the opportunity cost of pro-
duction income forgone should lower each citizen’s incentive
to engage in political rather than production activities. In
particular, one should expect this opportunity cost of polit-
ical involvement to be larger in countries where the market
returns to skilled labor are higher. In other words, a similar
interaction term between individual education and a coun-
try measure of the labor market skill premium should be
negatively correlated with political participation.
We proxy for the country skill premium using data on
wages for narrowly defined occupations, as surveyed in the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) annual inquiry. A
basic problem with the inquiry is that the raw data are
presented in a myriad of reporting concepts (e.g., average
earnings versus minimum wages) that makes direct com-
parisons difficult. A significant improvement was made in
standardizing this data by Freeman and Oostendorp (2001),
who performed a careful data-cleaning and econometric cal-
ibration to obtain consistent cross-country wage series. Their
Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) data set
provides wage information on 161 occupations, with more
than 130 countries represented between 1983 and 2003.
However, these data are very unbalanced in that countries
rarely report wages for all occupations in all years. This
will limit us in terms of the size of our eventual regression
sample.
We consider two alternative measures of occupational
skill in table 5. The first, stenographer-typist in the bank-
ing industry (occupation 130), is meant to capture the labor
market returns to basic skills: a high school–level compe-
tency in literacy and language. Separately, we also use the
wages reported for a computer programmer in the insurance
industry (occupation 133), which reflects skills of a more
advanced or technical nature. To obtain a skill premium, we
express these skilled wages relative to a baseline wage in
20 This is also consistent with the recent evidence pointing to a weak link,
if any, from schooling to turnout in some settings (Tenn, 2007; Kam &
Palmer, 2008; Berinsky & Lenz, 2008).
an unskilled occupation (occupation 90: laborers in the con-
struction industry).21 Although the two skilled occupations
notionally reflect different skilled abilities, the two skill pre-
mium measures are highly correlated (Pearson correlation =
0.68).
Table 5 reports these findings on the effect of the country
skill premium. The regressions follow equation (2), with the
country skill premium now included in the vector of country
variables, Wct . Column 1 reports a basic specification using
the first principal component measure of political participa-
tion from the WVS as the dependent variable, with the only
interaction being that between individual education and the
relevant measure of the skill premium; all regressions already
include individual controls and country-wave fixed effects.
We find strong evidence that participation is less responsive
to individual schooling in countries where the skill premium
is higher, as indicated by the negative and significant inter-
action coefficients for both occupational skill measures. This
coefficient consistently remains negative when we include
further controls, although its significance tends to suffer due
to the more limited cross-country variation as the regression
sample shrinks, particularly for computer programmer.
The results in column 2, which includes the interactions
between schooling and country factor endowments, are par-
ticularly interesting. Controlling for factor endowments leads
to a slight fall in the magnitude of the coefficient on the skill
premium interaction; this fall is more pronounced for the
computer programmer wage premium, where the coefficient
is in fact no longer significant.22 Moreover, the comparison
with table 1, column 2, shows a substantial drop in the coef-
ficients associated with the factor endowment interactions.
These smaller coefficient magnitudes suggest that the effect
of country endowments operates at least partially through its
influence on the country skill premium.23
Column 3 reaffirms these findings using the full specifica-
tion from table 1, column 7, which includes all the interaction
terms between individual schooling and the auxiliary country
variables. The negative elasticity effect of the skill premium
interaction remains, although it is marginally insignificant
where computer programmer wages have been used. We
once again observe a decrease in the magnitude of the skill
21 We have experimented with other skilled occupations in the numera-
tor, such as stenographer-typist in other industries, accountant, and general
physician. The results were all very similar, subject to the caveat that the
number of observations available for these other occupations was generally
smaller. The OWW also reports unskilled laborer wages in other industries,
but these are all highly correlated to that in construction.
22 This is not an artifact of the reduced sample size. When we run the
lean column 1 specification using only those countries in the column 2
sample, we obtain a skill premium interaction coefficient equal to −0.059
and −0.056, respectively, for both panels, both significant at the 1% level.
23 This suggests an alternative approach: using the factor endowments as
an instrument for the skill premium. We believe that this might stretch the
limited data too far and that the exogeneity of the endowments (particularly
human and physical capital) is open to question; hence, we do not include
it in the tables we present. For what it is worth, the results with these
instrumental variables are very much in line with the hypothesis: a negative
and significant coefficient on the skill premium at the 5% level for both skill
premia measures (results available on request).
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Table 5.—Education, the Skill Premium, and Political Participation
First Principal Component (WVS) Voting (CSES)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Stenographer-typist
Education 0.200∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.112 0.126 0.264∗∗∗ 0.023
[0.015] [0.047] [0.246] [0.234] [0.051] [0.278]
Education × Log (Skill Premium) −0.056∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.127∗∗ −0.113 0.001 −0.055
[0.013] [0.022] [0.050] [0.068] [0.063] [0.130]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.002 0.054
[0.004] [0.011] [0.046]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.017 0.043 0.008
[0.018] [0.115] [0.060]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.102 −0.154∗ 0.286∗
[0.080] [0.086] [0.151]
Education × Obedience −0.093 −0.100
[0.072] [0.091]
Observations 42,448 34,080 31,922 28,629 31,041 24,710
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.14 0.15
Number of countries 28 20 20 16 15 11
Number of surveys 38 29 26 22 24 18
Computer Programmer
Education 0.227∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ −0.172 −0.544∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.091
[0.015] [0.050] [0.190] [0.200] [0.078] [0.224]
Education × Log (Skill Premium) −0.066∗∗∗ −0.044 −0.069 −0.056 −0.056 −0.038
[0.015] [0.039] [0.048] [0.051] [0.066] [0.095]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.012 0.025 0.102∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.016] [0.017]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.013 −0.117 0.055∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.143] [0.016]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.071 −0.275∗∗∗ 0.112
[0.091] [0.081] [0.102]
Education × Obedience −0.003 −0.001
[0.042] [0.053]
Observations 41,064 30,245 27,905 25,619 29,712 23,112
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.15
Number of countries 26 18 17 14 15 11
Number of surveys 38 26 23 20 23 17
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding outlier countries? No No Yes Yes No No
Income × Country Wave? No No Yes Yes No No
Imputed individual controls? No No Yes Yes No No
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, levels respectively. All regressions include individual-level controls for age, age squared, a gender dummy,
a married dummy, number of children, a student dummy, an employment status dummy, and income decile/quintile; and country-wave/module fixed effects. Columns 1 and 5 report a lean specification containing
the interaction terms involving individual education and the log skill premium only. Columns 2 and 6 include the three country factor endowment interactions. Column 3 includes the interactions between individual
education and auxillary country characteristics (log GDPpc, log Pop, Gini, ELF Ethnic, Democracy, Socialist, and Obedience); excludes country outliers (SGP, UGA); includes the income by country-wave/module
dummy controls; and applies the imputation procedure for missing individual controls. Column 4 adds the country factor endowment interactions to the column 3 specification. The CSES regressions also control for
the interaction between individual education and the compulsory voting indicator.
premium interaction in column 4, where we further control
for the interactions between individual education and country
factor endowments.
For completeness, the final two columns in table 4 present
the results using the voting data from the CSES, following
the lean specification used in columns 1 and 2 for the WVS.
Although the coefficient on the skill premium interaction is
for the most part negative, the significance is much weaker.
This is likely a consequence of the reduced country coverage
in the CSES, as well as the fact that voting is a qualitatively
less active form of political engagement. (Results with more
comprehensive controls are similar and hence omitted here.)
In sum, the available data on country skill premiums pro-
vide some support for the intuition that the role of factor
endowments is linked to their effect on citizens’ incentives
over the use of their human capital. That said, one should
be cautious not to overinterpret table 5, particularly since the
country overlap between the OWW and the WVS samples
leavesuswitha relativelysmallnumberofcountries, andmore
so as more controls are added. We thus view this evidence as
being of a more supplementary and suggestive nature.
B. Natural Resource Exports
The logic behind our proposed explanation also implies
that countries that specialize more in resource-intensive sec-
tors such as agriculture, and hence exhibit a lower relative
return to human capital, should see political participation
being more responsive to increases in education at the indi-
vidual level. This resource intensiveness is most directly
reflected in the factor endowment mix, but we can also mea-
sure this from a different perspective using export data, on
the premise that resource-intensive economies are likely to
display a higher share of natural resource exports.
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Table 6.—Education, Natural Resource Exports, and Political Participation
First Principal Component (WVS) Voting (CSES)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit
Education 0.140∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ −0.050 −0.089 0.165∗∗ −0.106
[0.026] [0.048] [0.173] [0.250] [0.068] [0.170]
Education × Log (Food / Total Exports) 0.015∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.029 0.006
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.011] [0.027] [0.024]
Education × Log (Ores / Total Exports) −0.003 −0.003 0.002 0.003 −0.015 −0.034
[0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.022] [0.036]
Education × Log(T/L) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.002 0.046∗∗
[0.005] [0.011] [0.019]
Education × Log(K/L) 0.053∗∗∗ −0.004 0.033
[0.010] [0.045] [0.039]
Education × Log(H/L) −0.179∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗ 0.278
[0.066] [0.061] [0.184]
Education × Obedience −0.113∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗
[0.039] [0.040]
Education × Compulsory Vote 0.002 0.057
[0.040] [0.043]
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluding outlier countries? No No Yes Yes No No
Income × Country-wave? No No Yes Yes No No
Imputed individual controls? No No Yes Yes No No
Observations 93,258 73,856 74,650 64,583 72,102 56,978
R2 or pseudo-R2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.11 0.12
Number of countries 62 46 44 36 34 25
Number of surveys 85 65 58 49 56 42
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include individual-level controls for age, age squared, a gender dummy,
a married dummy, number of children, a student dummy, an employment status dummy, and income decile/quintile; and country-wave/module fixed effects. Columns 1 and 5 report a lean specification containing the
interaction terms between individual education and the two natural resource export variables. Columns 2 and 6 include the three country factor endowment interactions. Column 3 includes the interactions between
individual education and auxillary country characteristics (Log GDPpc, Log Pop, Gini, ELF Ethnic, Democracy, Socialist, and Obedience); excludes country outliers (SGP, UGA, DOM); includes the income by
country-wave/module dummies; and applies the imputation procedure for missing individual controls. Column 4 adds the factor endowment interactions as controls to the column 3 specification. The CSES regressions
also include the interaction between individual education and the compulsory voting indicator.
Table 6 explores the use of such alternative proxies for the
resource intensity of the economy; the column specifications
correspond to those in table 5. We consider food and agricul-
tural raw materials exports and ores and fuel exports, where
all export data are taken from the WDI and expressed as a
share of total merchandise exports for each country. Using the
first principal component measure from the WVS, columns
1 to 4 show that while ores and fuel exports have essentially
no discernible effect, there is a strong positive and significant
effect for the interaction with food and agricultural raw mate-
rials exports, confirming a more intense link between school-
ing and political participation in countries with a larger export
share in these latter resources. Including the export measures
leads to a fall in the coefficient associated with the land
endowment interaction (columns 2 and 4) when compared
to the corresponding specification in table 1, column 7. This
once again suggests that the effect of country factor endow-
ments operates through their influence over the production
(and hence export) structure of the economy. As before, the
results for voting, in columns 5 and 6, are much weaker.
C. Occupational Skill Intensity: Within-Country Evidence
Our proposed interpretation of these findings in the data
builds on the idea that the opportunity cost of engaging
in political activities can differ systematically across coun-
tries, depending on the underlying structure of each economy
in question. If this intuition is indeed operative, then we
should in principle be able to identify similar effects with
regard to the responsiveness of political participation to edu-
cation within a single country by comparing individuals with
varying opportunity costs of their time.
One natural proxy for an individual’s opportunity cost of
time would be the nature of the occupation that he or she is
employed in. To the extent that different occupations reflect
different skill intensities, our logic would predict that the
strength of the link between individual schooling and political
participation would vary across occupations. More specifi-
cally, suppose we were to compare two individuals with the
same education level, one of whom works in a skill-intensive
occupation and the other engages in an unskilled one. We
would then expect that the latter would have a lower oppor-
tunity cost of engaging in political activities, particularly in
an economy such as the United States that features a high
wage premium for skilled labor.
To this end, we explore specifications of the form:
PolPartit = β1Vi + β2Educi + β3Educi × DumSkilledi
+ Occi + Dt + εit . (3)
This seeks to explain the political participation of individu-
als (indexed by i) within a single country as a function once
again of individual characteristics (Vi), including education
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Table 7.—Education, Occupational Skill Intensity, and Political Participation: Within-U.S. Evidence
Dependent Variable:
First Princicpal Component (WVS), (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
United States Only OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Education 0.184∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
[0.031] [0.027] [0.024] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Education × Skilled Occupation Dummy −0.067∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.054∗
[0.034] [0.031] [0.029]
Education × Unskilled Occupation Dummy 0.067∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.063
[0.034] [0.039] [0.043]
Survey wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323 2,323
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Robust standard errors are reported, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include individual-level controls for age, age squared, a gender dummy, a
married dummy, number of children, a student dummy, an employment status dummy, and income decile; and survey wave fixed effects. Regression sample comprises the U.S. WVS respondents in waves 3 and 4
only. The skilled occupational dummy is defined by all employers/managers, professionals, nonmanual workers, and skilled manual workers (column 1); less employers/managers of establishments with fewer than 10
workers (column 2); less all employers/managers (column 3). The unskilled occupational dummy is defined by semi- and unskilled manual workers, individuals in agriculture, the military, who never had a job, or did
not report a job (column 4); less individuals in agriculture, the military, or did not report a job (column 5); less individuals in agriculture, the military, who never had a job, or did not report a job (column 6).
(Educi). We now include an interaction term between individ-
ual schooling and a dummy variable, DumSkilledi, indicating
whether the respondent is in a skilled occupation. Occi
denotes a full set of occupational dummies that control, in par-
ticular, for the main effect of DumSkilledi, while Dt are survey
wave fixed effects. We hypothesize that β3 < 0, namely, that
skilled workers exhibit a lower responsiveness of political
participation to individual schooling. This alternative look
has the advantage of enabling us to check our underlying
intuition within a single country, which helps assuage linger-
ing concerns regarding unobserved cross-country differences
that might have escaped our previous specifications.
Table 7 runs equation (3) on the subsample of U.S. obser-
vations in the WVS, using the first principal component
measure as the dependent variable. These U.S. observations
are from waves 3 and 4; prior surveys in the United States
did not contain information on either individual schooling or
political participation. In separate regressions not reported
(but available on request), we have obtained similar statis-
tically significant within-country findings for both Germany
and Great Britain. For DumSkilledi, we experiment with sev-
eral definitions of what constitutes a skilled occupation in
columns 1 to 3. Our broadest definition in column 1 codes as
skilled all employers/managers, professional workers, non-
manual workers, and skilled manual workers.24 Column 2
trims this definition to exclude employers/managers of fewer
than ten workers, since the skill requirement for running
such small establishments is likely to be less demanding.
Finally, column 3 excludes all employers/managers from
DumSkilledi. The results across all three columns consistently
support our underlying intuition. Overall, education is posi-
tively associated with political participation, but this effect is
weaker for respondents in skilled occupations for whom the
opportunity cost of time is presumably higher.
24 Specifically, this comprises employers/managers of establishment with
ten or more employed (WVS occupation code 13), employers/managers
of establishment with fewer than ten employed (16), professional workers
(21), nonmanual workers (22–25), foreman and supervisor (31), and skilled
manual worker (32).
Columns 4 to 6 perform the complementary exercise using
an interaction term between individual schooling and an
unskilled occupation dummy instead. Column 4 treats as
unskilled all occupations not classified as skilled in the
column 1 specification: semiskilled and unskilled manual
workers, farmer and agricultural workers, military mem-
bers, as well as those who have never held a job or did
not report one.25 Respondents in unskilled occupations do
indeed exhibit a higher responsiveness of political partici-
pation to schooling. One concern here is that this unskilled
dummy may be very noisy: the agricultural sector and the
military, or for that matter individuals with unreported occu-
pation, likely feature a heterogeneous mix of skill levels that
the WVS unfortunately does not allow us to distinguish; col-
umn 5 reruns the regression by removing these occupations
from the definition of the unskilled dummy. We continue to
find similar, if not stronger, results for the positive interaction
coefficient. Column 6 further removes individuals who have
never held a job from the unskilled occupation dummy; the
interaction coefficient remains positive but is now marginally
insignificant.
This within-country exercise thus provides reassuring
supporting evidence that the responsiveness of political par-
ticipation to schooling is indeed driven by an opportunity
cost logic. In particular, the results suggest that for unskilled
workers, the opportunity cost of production income forgone
is indeed lower, and hence their greater willingness to devote
a marginal unit of human capital to political rather than
production activities.
V. Factor Endowments, Political Participation, and
Public Provision of Schooling: An Extension
In this section, we pursue some broader political economy
implications of our opportunity cost explanation. In partic-
ular, we can address one of the key motivating questions
25 This comprises semiskilled manual worker (WVS occupation code 33),
unskilled manual worker (34), agriculture (41–42), armed forces (51), never
had a job (61), and missing.
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Table 8.—Cross-Country Relationship between Increases in Schooling and Initial Country Factor Endowments
Dependent Variable: Years of Schooling in 2000–Years of Schooling in 1975
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Schooling Variable (in Years) Total Total Total Total Total Total Primary Secondary Higher
Years of schooling, 1975 −0.007 −0.011 −0.024 −0.218∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.213 0.363∗∗
[0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.066] [0.065] [0.058] [0.049] [0.135] [0.180]
Democracy, 1975 0.006 0.009 0.044 −0.013 0.107∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.041∗ 0.004
[0.028] [0.029] [0.034] [0.027] [0.041] [0.044] [0.034] [0.023] [0.006]
Log (T/L), 1975 −0.118 −0.215∗∗ −0.065 −0.158 −0.548∗∗ −0.127 −0.315∗∗ −0.057∗∗
[0.088] [0.099] [0.084] [0.097] [0.232] [0.110] [0.133] [0.027]
Democracy × Log (T/L) 0.034∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.074∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.030∗ 0.008∗
[0.019] [0.015] [0.028] [0.013] [0.017] [0.005]
Log (K/L), 1975 0.496∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
[0.089] [0.085] [0.104] [0.073] [0.050] [0.011]
Democracy × Log (K/L) −0.033∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.001
[0.015] [0.014] [0.010] [0.011] [0.002]
Excluding outlier countries? No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 96 94 94 92 92 89 89 89 87
R2 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.54
Number of countries 96 94 94 92 92 89 89 89 87
Robust standard errors are reported, with ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The outliers dropped in columns 6–9 are BHR, KWT, and SGP, which have an initial
land-labor endowment more than three standard deviations smaller than the sample mean.
discussed in section I: what might lead country governments
to select different paths of human capital accumulation.
Consider a situation in which a (nondemocratic) ruler were
to decide on how much to invest in human capital for his cit-
izens, under the knowledge that more human capital would
increase productivity but would also increase political par-
ticipation. Although this is clearly a stark abstraction that
puts aside nuances in the political system or the role of pri-
vate agents in schooling decisions, it nevertheless helps to
highlight the role that initial conditions can play in influenc-
ing the incentives of governing regimes to promote human
capital accumulation.
As it turns out, we show in the appendix model that any
variable that increases aggregate political participation will
lead to less investment in human capital by the ruler. This
is because the ruler will anticipate the increased checks
that an active citizenry would place on him and will thus
attempt to dampen this effect by investing less in the state
provision of schooling initially. In particular, since a larger
land endowment decreases the opportunity cost of applying
human capital in politics by making it less productive in gen-
erating output, this in turn implies that a country with a higher
land endowment will invest less in human capital.26
We offer some suggestive evidence that the human capi-
tal accumulation experiences of countries in recent decades is
consistent with the predictions of this simple model, although
this is naturally subject to the data limitations faced by
empirical work in any pure cross-country setting. In table 8,
26 That the ruler can compensate for factors that raise political participation
by changing the amount of initial human capital investment implies that we
need not expect any correlation between measures of political participation
at the aggregate level and our country variables of interest, such as the per
worker land endowment. Going back to our motivating comparison between
East Asia and Latin America, this helps us to rationalize a situation where
countries with much higher levels of education do not necessarily display
higher levels of aggregate political participation.
we present the results of several regressions in which the
dependent variable is the change in average years of school-
ing between 1975 and 2000, computed from the Barro-Lee
(2000) data on years of education attainment in the popula-
tion aged 15 and over. We examine whether the initial factor
endowment attributes of the country affect future human cap-
ital accumulation paths and whether this relationship between
increases in schooling and initial factor endowments depends
on the initial level of democracy. We also include initial years
of schooling in 1975 to capture possible convergence effects
in the data, but our focus is on the other explanatory variables.
As shown in columns 1 and 2, the initial level of democracy
in 1975 (as measured on a 0–10 scale in the polity IV data set)
and the initial arable land endowment do not provide much
explanatory power for increases in the total years of school-
ing for citizens. The key result appears in column 3: when
we include an interaction term between initial democracy
and initial log(T/L), we find a negative and significant effect
of land abundance on future increases in schooling, as well
as a positive and significant effect on the interaction term.
That is, countries well endowed in land (relative to labor)
witnessed smaller increases in schooling, and this effect was
more pronounced for less democratic countries (with a low
Polity score). We take this last point as suggestive of a polit-
ical mechanism, such as that which we have sketched out in
our extension, being in operation.
These results are unaltered in columns 4 and 5, where
we further control for the initial physical capital stock per
worker and its interaction with Democracy, respectively.
We then check for robustness, by removing countries that
are potential outliers in terms of their initial factor endow-
ments.27 This in fact strengthens the statistical significance
27 We define outliers as being more than three standard deviations away
from the sample mean. This takes out three countries with especially low
land-labor ratios: Bahrain, Kuwait, and Singapore.
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of our results, as seen in column 6; in particular, the level
effect of the initial relative land endowment is once again
negative and significant at the 5% level. We finally investi-
gate which component of schooling—primary, secondary, or
higher (postsecondary)—might be driving our results based
on total years of schooling (columns 7–9). The effects are
most significant in the regressions run with secondary and
higher years of schooling (columns 8–9), consistent with the
view that awareness of and interest in political activities is
typically developed at these later stages of one’s education
experience. Consequently, the decision to provide access to
these higher levels of education is more sensitive to the initial
land endowment.
In short, the data at the cross-country level suggest a link
between initial factor endowments and subsequent human
capital accumulation paths, and that the nature of this rela-
tionship depends on whether countries were initially demo-
cratic or nondemocratic.
VI. Conclusion
We have argued that the link between individual school-
ing and political participation is affected and conditioned
by country-level variables. We have shown in the data that
a higher per-worker land endowment tends to strengthen
the positive correlation between schooling and individual
political participation, while a higher economy-wide human
capital endowment tends to weaken it instead. We have also
shown that cultural attitudes that favor obedience will also
weaken that link. Finally, we have provided evidence that
these effects are much less pronounced in the case of voting
than for more active forms of political participation.
We have developed an interpretation for these findings
based on the idea that country-level variables affect the
relative productivity of human capital in political versus
production activities. In countries where human capital is
more valuable in production, individuals will be less likely to
devote increases in human capital toward political activities,
which implies a weaker link between schooling and political
participation.
This interpretation is consistent with the evidence we pre-
sented on how a higher skill premium is associated with a
lesser impact of schooling on individual engagement with
politics. Also in line with this interpretation, we showed that
the natural resource intensity of a country’s exports, whose
exploitation is presumably not intensive in human capital,
has a similar effect to that of a greater land endowment.
And at the within-country level, we have also found the link
between schooling and political participation to be weaker
for individuals employed in skilled occupations.
We argue that our framework can help us to understand how
initial endowment conditions may have influenced the human
capital accumulation decisions that various country govern-
ments have pursued. This can even be seen as yet another
manifestation of the “natural resource curse”: the abundance
of natural resources could hinder growth by discouraging
governments from investing in human capital for fear of
breeding political activism, particularly in nondemocratic
countries.
It should be stressed that we view our framework as in fact
complementary to other explanations raised in this debate
that are based on cultural values and political institutions.
This is apparent from our empirical results, in which we
emphasize that country-level variables of that nature (respec-
tively, attitudes toward obedience and compulsory voting
laws) are also important in understanding the individual link
between schooling and political participation. Nevertheless,
we believe there is promise in investigating how variables
such as factor endowments or other initial conditions can
help us understand how such cultural and institutional ele-
ments themselves arise and are sustained in equilibrium. We
leave this line of questioning for future research.
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